











The study of policy dynamics at the sub-national level in federal systems 
is getting growing attention by scholars of comparative politics and agenda-
setting. These studies analyze to what extent the political agendas of regional 
governments are converging or diverging over time, focusing on: institutional 
factors (e.g., formal rules defining issue jurisdiction, type of government, 
intergovernmental arrangements), preferences (mostly of political parties), and 
agenda capacity (Hooghe et al. 2008). This constitutes an important change 
from previous analysis on comparative federalism, which traditionally focused 
on institutions as explanatory variable, providing a static outlook on the vertical 
distribution of authority between levels of government (Wibbels 2003). It also 
constitutes an important change in relation to another set of studies (Filippov et 
al. 2004; Wibbels 2006; Aldrich 1995) that pay attention to party politics and policy 
preferences, but still deal mainly with the relationship between the national and 
regional governments as a whole (e.g., Constantelos 2010). Finally, analyses of 
issue prioritization at the sub-national level (and the relations with the national 
and supranational level of governance) also make a contribution to the policy 
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...in the case of Canada, results 
indicate that provincial agendas 
are converging over time, and 
this is mainly related to inter-
governmental dynamics.
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dynamics approach (Jones and Baumgartner 2005, 
Baumgartner et al. 2011). Thus far, this approach 
has centered on the national level (Adler and 
Wilkerson 2012; Breunig 2011) and, more recently, 
the European level (Timmermans and Alexandrova 
2011; Alexandrova et al. 2012).
Recent research (Chaques-Bonafont and 
Palau 2011; Montpetit 2012) on policy dynamics 
at the sub-national level uses extensive databases 
developed according to the methodology of the 
Comparative Agendas Project. This allows us to go 
beyond case studies, and provides a comprehensive 
analysis about the pattern of issue prioritization 
across sub-national governments and countries’ 
policy sub-systems over time. Our preliminary 
results already illustrate that agenda dynamics 
at the sub-national level are shaped by a mix of 
factors, including party politics and institutions. For 
example, the constitutional 
distribution of competencies 
in a federation imposes 
important constraints on 
the capacity of sub-national 
governments to pursue their 
policy goals and define their 
priorities independently 
over time. Differences in 
fiscal autonomy between 
the Basque Country and 
Navarra, on the one hand, and the other regional 
governments of Spain partly explain the divergence 
in patterns of prioritization of issues between these 
two sets of comunidades autónomas (CCAA). The gap 
between the revenues and formal responsibilities 
of the Catalan government, combined with the 
investment deficit of the Spanish government in 
public infrastructures, has dominated the Catalan 
agenda throughout the past few decades. In 
contrast, these issues have occupied only a minor 
position on the agenda of the Basque government, 
which benefits from fiscal powers to set base rates 
and collect taxes, out of which only a share is sent 
to the Spanish government. 
A comparable asymmetry in the 
constitutional division of policy responsibilities 
does not exist in Canada. The Canadian constitution 
defines the same sets of competencies for all 10 
provinces. Likewise, all provinces enjoy similar fiscal 
powers and equally benefit from federal transfers. 
In addition, the constitution requires that the 
federal government equalizes the revenues across 
provinces, so that less-wealthy provinces can afford 
to offer services similar to those offered by wealthy 
provinces. In other words, as policy competencies 
and revenues are distributed relatively equally 
across provinces in Canada, nothing in the 
Canadian federal arrangement prevents provinces 
from having similar priorities, just as nothing incites 
them to pay attention to different issues, such as in 
Spain.
Nevertheless, institutional arrangements 
do not offer a full explanation of the strength of 
convergence in Canada in comparison with Spain. 
In fact, neither convergence – strong or weaker 
– nor divergence can fully 
capture the Canadian and 
Spanish situation over a 
long period. Examples of 
divergence can be found 
in Canada and examples 
of strong convergence can 
be found in Spain. In the 
case of Spain, part of the 
explanation relies on party 
preferences and type of 
governments. Our results indicate that legislative 
agendas are more similar when the same political 
party is governing in different CCAA. Likewise, we 
show that legislative agendas at the national and 
regional levels are more similar under minority 
governments. In contrast, in the case of Canada, 
results indicate that provincial agendas are 
converging over time, and this is mainly related to 
intergovernmental dynamics. 
In this contribution we present some of the 
evidence generated by the Comparative Agendas 
Project in Spain and Canada. We rely on large 
and comprehensive databases on laws from 1980 
to 2007 in Spain and executive speeches from 
1960 to 2010 in Canada. The agendas in the two 
countries were systematically coded following 
the methodology of the Comparative Agendas 
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Project. At the current stage of our research, the 
data are not fully compatible, as they pertain to 
the legislative agenda in Spain and the executive 
agenda in Canada. We must be cautious in making 
direct comparisons between these different types 
of agendas. Nevertheless, the preliminary analysis 
suggests that we can learn much about policy 
dynamics from data on the Canadian and Spanish 
agendas.
Policy dynamics in Canada and Spain
In Spain, the analysis of legislative agendas 
in Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque 
Country indicates that regional policymakers 
are paying attention to similar issues but with 
important variations over time. Table 1 presents 
correlations of agenda priorities for each 
pair of Spanish regional governments for the 
period 1980–2007. With a mean correlation of 
0.32 and most coefficients being statistically 
significant, we can conclude that a modest level 
of correspondence exists in the priorities of sub-
national governments. In comparison, the mean 
correlation of interprovincial priorities in Canada is 
0.43 for the period 1985–2010, indicating stronger 
correlations of priorities.
The Spanish regional law agendas are linked 
to each other, and this was especially the case in 
the 1980s, when regional governments had to 
accomplish two crucial goals: the construction 
of their basic political institutions and the 
development of the welfare state. But correlations 
across the regional law agendas decreased 
gradually, falling under 0.2 between 2003 and 
2007. Figure 1 shows important annual variations 
and a clear downward trend starting in 2001. 
In addition, figure 1 indicates that interregional 
correlations are not systematically higher or lower 
than regional-state correlations.
In sharp contrast, correlations of policy 
priorities across provinces have steadily increased 
since the 1970–1974 period in Canada, as shown in 
figure 2. Although federal-provincial correlations go 
up and down in a cycle, interprovincial correlations 
are systematically above federal-provincial ones. 
Beginning in the 1990s, legislative agendas in Spain 
were increasingly diverse, and this is explained 
not only by the institutional factors mentioned in 
the introduction, but also by party preferences 
(Chaqués and Palau 2011). The Spanish Constitution 
and the Estatutos de Autonomía impose important 
constraints on the legislative agenda of regional 
policymakers. The asymmetric and open character 
of the Spanish quasi-federal state help explain 
why Catalonia and the Basque Country have more 
jurisdiction over the civil code in contrast to other 
CCAA (and why attention to economic issues has 
increased since the late 1990s in some CCAA such as 
Catalonia, after the fiscal reform of 1997. The formal 
distribution of authority constrains or enables given 
structures of priorities, but its relative static nature 
cannot account for important variations over time. 
Our results indicate that party preferences matter. 
Regional legislative agendas have become similar 
Catalonia Basque Country Galicia Andalusia State
Catalonia 1 .247** .335** .364** .340**
Basque Country .247** 1 .333** .301** .378**
Galicia .335** .333** 1 .343** .366**
Andalusia .364** .301** .343** 1 .379**
State .340** .378** .366** .379** 1
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 1. Pearson correlations between the national and regional legislative agendas
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Figure 1. Mean annual correlation between regional and national legislative agendas in Spain (1983–2007)
in regions governed by the same political party, 
while the legislative agendas of regions governed 
by competing parties diverge. When the socialists 
govern in Andalusia and Catalonia,1 the legislative 
agendas tended to converge, and the same is true 
when conservative-nationalist political parties 
(CIU and PNV) are governing in Catalonia and the 
Basque Country. When different parties govern 
these regions, different priorities appear. 
Party preferences are also important to 
explain differences in issue attention across levels 
of government. As figure 1 illustrates, annual 
correlation between legislative agendas increases 
when the PSOE is governing in Madrid and the PSC 
is governing in Catalonia (2004–2007). Our results 
further show that similarities and/or differences 
depend in part on the type of government. The 
Spanish and regional agendas are more similar 
when the Spanish government depends on the 
support of regional political parties in government 
formation. The annual correlation between the 
Spanish and Catalan legislative agendas increases 
when the CIU is pivotal in the formation of the 
national government (1993–2000) and when the 
CIU depends on the support of the PP (Partido 
Popular) for the formation of government 
in Catalonia (1999–2003). Similarly, annual 
correlations between the Basque and the Spanish 
law agendas increase when the PNV is pivotal at 
the national level and when the PNV depends 
on the support of the socialist party (PSE) for the 
formation of government in the Basque Country. 
The opposite occurs when the Spanish government 
has the majority of seats in the Spanish parliament. 
The current political situation in Spain supports 
these observations. The rising of the independence 
movements in Catalonia and the Basque Country 
1  The Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya has been govern-
ing in coalition with Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
(ERC) and Iniciativa per Catalunya-Esquerra Unida (IC-EU) 
since 2003. In this analysis we consider that the two regional 
governments are governed by the same political party, or 
a party of the same federation (such as PSOE, the socialist 
party in Spain, and PSC, the socialist party of Catalonia). 
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(two of the three regions – with Andalusia being 
the third – not governed by the PP) stresses the 
confrontation between the Spanish government 
and the regions, most specifically after the PP won 
the elections by absolute majority in 2011.
Political parties do not have an equal 
propensity to generate divergence and convergence 
in Canada. Part of the explanation has to do with 
the absence of national party federations. In 
comparison with Spain, the Canadian federation is 
highly decentralized, to a point where federal and 
provincial parties are entirely autonomous from 
each other, organizationally as much as ideologically. 
For example, the Liberal Party of Canada, a federal 
party, does not share any organizational capacity 
with the Liberal Party of British Colombia (the BC 
Liberals). In addition, the ideology of the BC Liberals 
has become closer to the ideology of the federal 
Conservative Party over the years. Therefore, party 
labels in Canada are poor predictors of priority 
convergence or divergence. In recent years, there 
were notorious fights between conservatives (the 
federal and Newfoundland conservatives, for 
example), as well as counterintuitive alliances. 
An example is the rapprochement between the 
Conservative Harris government in Ontario and the 
social democrats independentist government of 
Bouchard in Quebec, which analysts puzzled over 
at the end of the 1990s.
There is no doubt that the Canadian 
constitution, which treats all provinces equally, 
enables a great deal of convergence of provincial 
priorities. But as in Spain, the Canadian constitution 
constrains and enables, but fails to drive policy 
priorities. In fact, the decentralization of the 
federation enables provinces to set their own 
priorities in a much larger number of issue areas 
than in Spain. This maneuvering space makes the 
importance of interprovincial convergence even 
more puzzling, although it might contribute to the 
explanation of the weakness of the convergence 
between federal and provincial priorities. Studies 
find that convergence is related to interprovincial 
relations dominated by civil servants motivated 
Figure 2. Difference between federal-provincial and interprovincial correlations
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by problem-solving (Inwood, Johns and O’Reilly 
2011; Montpetit and Foucault 2012). Facing similar 
problems, provincial officials interact a great deal 
to find solutions. And in turn their interactions 
further encourage their respective governments 
to prioritize the same issues (Montpetit 2012). In 
contrast, in Spain, existing analysis shows the lack 
of this type of interaction and cooperation across 
regional governments (Subirats and Gallego 2002).
Figure 3 provides evidence of this dynamic. 
In comparison with Spain, Canada is a very large 
country, some 6,000 kilometers wide and spanning 
four time zones. Eastern, central, and western 
economies significantly differ from each other 
and therefore the problems facing the east, the 
center, and the west of Canada are quite different. 
Logically then, if interprovincial relations are 
motivated by problem-solving, correlations of 
priorities should be even stronger within regional 
blocs. This is exactly what figure 3 shows. The 
figure features predicted margins, produced from 
simulations flowing from a regression analysis. 
Correlations for pairs of provinces from different 
regions serve as the baseline (the vertical line). 
Confirming that overall interprovincial correlations 
are higher than federal-provincial ones, figure 3 
also indicates that western provinces, on the one 
hand, and eastern provinces on the other have 
statistically distinct and higher correlations than 
provinces from different regions. More research 
is needed, but this pattern is consistent with the 
willingness of provincial administrations to address 
concrete problems. In contrast, federal-provincial 
relations are more frequently plagued by all kinds 
of dispute, including jurisdictional struggles, which 
encouraged a differentiation of priorities between 
the federal capital Ottawa and the provinces. The 
constitutional disputes of the 1980s and 1990s 
pushed the federal government and provincial 
governments in different directions, encouraging 
the election of the Conservative Party at the 
federal level in 2006. This party openly promotes 
a federal agenda limited to policy domains falling 
under federal jurisdictions.
Conclusion
Policy dynamics across sub-national 
governments follow different patterns in Canada 
Figure 3. Intensity of interprovincial relations by region
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and Spain. Intergovernmental dynamics generate 
increasing similarities in executive agendas in 
Canada, while in Spain, similarities between 
legislative agendas are more linked to party 
politics and type of government. We have argued 
that institutional features in the two federal 
arrangements contribute to the explanation of 
differences in the patterns of prioritization of 
policy issues in the two countries over time. 
Canada’s stable and symmetric division of policy 
responsibilities encourages interprovincial 
convergence, while Spain’s open and asymmetric 
division of issue jurisdiction generates a process of 
permanent negotiation about political autonomy 
between the Spanish government and the regions. 
The current extremely tense political situation in 
Spain illustrates the implications of this institutional 
arrangement. Legislative agendas are more similar 
depending on which political party is governing and 
under what circumstances (minority or majority 
governments). In Canada, such dynamics do not 
occur, leaving interprovincial relations mostly in 
the hands of civil servants concerned with concrete 
policy problems. As a consequence, government 
priorities develop in the same direction.
From here, our goal is to go further in the 
comparison of policy dynamics in federal systems 
of governance (Chaqués, Palau, and Baumgartner 
2013). This means expanding existing datasets 
about the executive (speeches, executive orders) 
and legislative agenda (parliamentary bills, laws) 
in view of comparing policy dynamics, taking into 
account the institutional characteristics of each 
political system. This also means further steps in the 
definition of common hypotheses and theoretical 
explanations of the way in which regional 
governments prioritize policy problems over time. 
With this line of research, we seek to establish a 
closer link between the policy agendas approach 
and existing analysis of policy convergence and 
comparative federalism.
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